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Abstract
This paper re-evaluates the forward premium puzzle using the Euro/US
dollar exchange rate. Unlike previous studies, a state-space model is used to
measure the signicance of this puzzle by estimating the time-specic para-
meter. Then we provide evidence that the forward premium puzzle became
more prominent around the time of the Lehman Shock, and this additional ef-
fect of the puzzle is more clearly seen in longer maturity assets. Furthermore,
while the risk premium does not tell the whole story about the time-varying
puzzle, we show nevertheless that the puzzle can be lessened by this extra
factor particularly at times of nancial crises.
JEL classication: F31, F36, G01
Keywords: forward premium puzzle, risk premium, time-varying
parameters, nancial crises
1 Introduction
The forward premium (or discount) puzzle can be regarded broadly as a viola-
tion of the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP) condition which suggests an equi-
proportional relationship between the forward premium and interest rate di¤eren-
tials. Despite the popularity of the CIRP in international nance however, there is
mounting evidence against this theoretical prediction (e.g., Fama 1984). According
to a survey of previous studies which focused largely on advanced countries (Froot
and Thaler 1990), the CIRP relationship is often negative; the average size of this
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parameter reported in previous studies is -0.88. Due to the pervasive implications
of this bias to open market economic theories,1 a lot of research has been carried
out in the past to seek explanations of a failure of the CIRP.
Among others, previous studies point to three sources of the violation of the
CIRP. One reason is related to the risk premium, which relaxes the assumption of the
CIRP about investorsrisk neutrality and introduces their risk aversion behaviors
in the model. The second reason is connected with the di¤erent timing of data
quotations. Since research requires several economic indicators and is conducted in
an international context, the data are likely recorded at di¤erent times. Actually
when the consistently quoted data are used for analysis, more evidence is reported
in favor of the CIRP (Taylor 1989). Finally, recent research, often referred to as
the market microstructure model, emphasizes the role of private information in
explaining exchange rate movements (e.g., Burnside et al, 2009). This departs from
the standard CIRP model which is based on public information, and when order
ow data are included in the model to capture private information, there is evidence
of improvements in the interest parity relationship (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002).2
Against this background, we analyze whether or not the forward premium puzzle
has become more signicant during recent periods which contain a number of nan-
cial crises. Furthermore, if this puzzle is found to be more signicant, we attempt
to explain the relationship between the puzzle and the risk premium.3
Previous research on the foreign exchange risk premium often relied on one of the
following two methodologies. First, there is a branch of studies incorporating the
risk premium using statistical models such as the Generalized Auto-Regressive Con-
ditional Heteroschedasticity (GARCH) model. Notably, Engle et al (1987) model
the premium using the GARCH-in-mean, but this type of model faces identication
problems, when regarding conditional variance as the premium, because of lack of a
theoretical foundation. Second, some researchers (e.g., Lusting and Verdelhan 2007,
Kocenda and Poghosyan 2009) opt to employ the model like a Consumption Capital
Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM) to explain the premium, which contains more the-
oretical mechanisms for explaining the risk premium. However, it is well known in
nance literature that consumption growth is not volatile enough to explain nan-
1For example, the CIRP is considered the most appropriate economic theory for measuring
international nancial mobility (Frankel 1992).
2Needless to say, evidence of the CIRP does not mean that there are no arbitrage opportunities.
It only suggests that on average the CIRP is an appropriate economic concept.
3Our focus on the risk premium is partly due to our lack of access to order ow data and high
frequency (tick) data which are more sensitive to the timing of quotations.
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cial asset returns. Furthermore, the data availability of consumption is limited; even
monthly data are not available for research. Thus in order to circumvent some de-
ciencies discussed above, unlike previous studies, we attempt to introduce a proxy
for the risk premium to the standard CIRP.
2 Forward Premium Puzzle
The forward premium puzzle is one of the great unsolved research topics, rst pointed
out by Fama (1984), in international nance. Fama discussed this puzzle mainly in
the context of the relationship between the forward premium and exchange rate
changes, and most previous research (see Froot and Frankel 1989, Hall et al 2011)
investigated Famas specication partly because of easier access to data. However,
we will conduct research in the framework of the forward premium and interest
rates, i.e., the CIRP, which is more often cited in introductory textbooks and does
not hinge upon investors rationality. It is attractive to use this CIRP since the
rational expectations assumption is normally required for the Fama specication
but is not well supported by actual data (MacDonald and Torrance 1990).
The CIRP implies the equalization of returns from investment at home and
abroad under the assumption of no risk premium. The di¤erence in these invest-
ment strategies arises only from the currency denomination of nancial assets. More
specically, let us consider the following the standard linear time-series CIRP rela-
tionship for di¤erent forward contract periods (j).
fpjt = + 1eit + et (1)
The fpjt is the forward premium (fptj = ftj   st) at time t, where the spot and
jth-period forward exchange rates are expressed in natural logarithmic form as s
and f respectively. The interest rate di¤erential is shown as ei (i.e., eit = ijt   ijt ),
and the asterisk indicates a foreign variable. Greek letters are parameters to be
estimated, and e is the residual. When the CIRP is an appropriate concept, a
parameter restriction (1 = 1) must be supported by the data.
However, as referred to in the Introduction, the forward premium puzzle is often
reported as being present in recent data among advanced countries (i.e., 1 < 1);
furthermore, this puzzle is more frequently observed in advanced countries than in
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developing countries (Bansal and Dahlquist 2000; Frankel and Poonawala, 2010).4
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), for example, argued that countries with high per capita
income and low ination the characteristics of advanced countries tend to su¤er
more seriously from this bias.
The forward premium puzzle can be expressed in terms of a misspecication bias.
In this regard, let us relax the assumption about risk neutrality in the standard
CIRP. Then Eq.1 is generalized by incorporating a proxy of the risk premium (Rp)
and is re-expressed as:
fpjt = + 1eit + 2Rpt + et (2)
When Eq. 1 is estimated incorrectly instead of Eq. 2, there will be a bias in the
estimate indicating the presence of a forward premium puzzle. Under regulatory
conditions, this phenomenon can be expressed using the OLS estimates of Eq. 2 as:
plimb1 = 1 + 2Cov(eit; Rpt)
V ar(eit) (3)
The omission of Rp brings about a bias which is represented by the second
component of the RHS in this equation. This bias remains signicant when 2 6= 0
and Cov(eit; Rpt) 6= 0, and in such a case, the estimate will deviate from the true
value, 1 = 1. Furthermore, when the second component of the RHS is negative,
the estimate of 1 will be downwardly biased (b1<1). Thus a statistical condition
of the forward premium puzzle is either 2<0 and Cov(eit; Rpt)>0 , or 2>0 and
Cov(eit; Rpt)<0. Given the presence of the forward premium puzzle often reported
in previous studies, it would be expected that introduction of a risk premium would
alleviate the puzzle.
There are studies providing indirect evidence of the forward premium puzzle
during the recent period by examining the size of deviation from the CIRP, which
can be obtained by subtracting interest rate di¤erentials from the forward premium.
For example, deviation from the CIRP became increasingly signicant from the
summer of 2007 by when the sub-prime loan problem had become more apparent,
and it was argued that this deviation is linked with credit and counterparty risk
(Co¤ey et al 2009, Levich 2011).
Furthermore, using the Fama-type statistical relationship, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995) argue that small sample problem and price rigidities can cause the forward
4See Engel (1996) for a comprehensive survey on the forward premium anomaly.
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premium puzzle. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) point to infrequent portfolio
adjustments as a reason for the puzzle, and Gri¤oli and Panaldo (2011) suggest
insu¢ cient liquidity in the nancial market as an explanation. In this regard, there
may be several factors involved in explaining the forward premium puzzle, and thus
our attempt to focus on the risk premium may not fully remedy the standard model.
3 Data and preliminary analysis
Our data are monthly and cover the sample period from 1998M11-2012M4 for the
Euro/US$ exchange rates (see Appendix).5 The beginning of the sample period is
determined by the timing of the creation of the Euro, and this pair of currencies is
chosen since they are most frequently traded by nancial institutions in foreign ex-
change markets (Bank for International Settlements 2010). Furthermore the recent
nancial crises (i.e., the Lehman Shock and Greek sovereign debt crisis) are deeply
rooted in these regions. The interest rates are the London Interbank O¤ered Rates
(LIBOR), the most widely used reference rates for the short-term, and cover matu-
rity lengths of 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months (i.e., j = 1; 2; 3; 6; 9; 12).6 While longer
forward contracts are available, our main focus goes to relatively short-term rates
(i.e., a less than one year maturity) since the majority of forward transactions are
of less than one month maturity length (Bank for International Settlements 2010).
In addition, we use the level of nancial turmoil as a proxy for the risk pre-
mium; the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (CBOEV) for the US
market and the EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXXI) for the Euro area.
These indices are closely associated with nancial crises and follow a similar compi-
lation methodology. Their increases are viewed as representing higher uncertainty
or volatility (in the next 30 days) in prices of the benchmark (S&P500 and EURO
STOXX 50) indices which are closely linked with option values.7 We expect that
when these variables increase, extra returns (i.e., the risk premium) are required
for investment. One advantage of these data is that the data are discrete but give
us more timely information about the level of nancial chaos compared with, for
5All data are downloaded from DataStream.
6The quality of the LIBOR has been questioned recently (July 2012) as some banks allegedly
indulged in illegal operations in order to control this rate.
7See the Chicago Board Options Exchange (2009) about compilation methodology. Our motiva-
tion for introducing these variables is similar to one using the GARCH-type model which estimates
the conditional variance as a proxy for the time-varying risk premium.
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example, credit ratings. This allows us to conduct research without prior knowledge
of the exact timing of nancial crises.
These proxies, which are used as a representative of the risk premium in each
country, are shown in the gure and are summarized in the table. Fig.1 indicates
that these proxies are highly and positively correlated with each other pointing to
similar periods of nancial market turmoil in these markets. Furthermore, high -
nancial uncertainty exists at times of stock market downturns due to the burst IT
bubble (2000-01), the September 11 attacks (2001), the aftermath of the Lehman
Shock (2008), and the Greek sovereign debt problem (2011-12). Table 1 summa-
rizes the basic statistics of the forward premium and interest rate di¤erentials for a
variety of maturity lengths. The average value of these variables is reported to be
negative. Furthermore, their variation in terms of the standard error (SE) suggests
that interest rate di¤erentials are more volatile than forward premiums.
Table 2 reports correlation coe¢ cients obtained for the interest rate di¤erentials
and a proxy for a risk premium (Rp). It turns out that the correlation level between
interest rates with di¤erent maturities is very highmore than 90%and furthermore,
a positive correlation is obtained between interest rate di¤erentials andRp. It follows
that the risk premium tends to increase at times when di¤erent types of monetary
policy are implemented in these regions. The correlation level between interest rate
di¤erentials and Rp seems to increase along with rises in the maturity length. This
may be an indication that longer term rates contain more information about the risk
for each nancial market as it is composed of more signicant investorsexpectations
(like ination). Finally, Rp in these regions is highly correlated with one another,
suggesting a high level of nancial market integration.
As a further preliminary analysis, Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of the CIRP
using the Newey-West method in order to make an adjustment for autocorrelation.
The estimates are reported to be positive, and thus the severity of the forward
premium puzzle seems to be lessened compared with one using older observations
which often report a negative sign (Fama 1984, Froot and Frankel 1989). Further-
more, the size of these parameters increases along with maturity length, and that of
a 12 month maturity is about 10 times higher than that of a 1 month maturity and
approaches a theoretical value of unity. Stronger evidence of the CIRP for longer
maturity lengths is consistent with Chinn and Meredith (2004) who raised support-
ive evidence for the longer-term Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition due to
the domination of economic fundamentals in exchange rate changes.
We conduct two types of instability test; the Andrews-Quandt and Andrews-
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Ploberger tests, in order to analyze the parameter stabilities. The statistics are
based on OLS estimates but are adjusted for heteroschedasticity, and in order to
examine the null hypothesis that all parameters are invariant over time, p-values are
obtained using the statistical method proposed by Hansen (1997). Table 3 reports
results from these tests which are conducted for the trimmed sample period, and
shows that this null is strongly rejected in all cases.8
Furthermore, the table provides evidence of a structural break at the time of the
Lehman Shock (2008M9). The break date is identied by the most extreme value
of F statistic (i.e., the smallest p-value) within the sample period, and the presence
of structural breaks is consistent with a further violation of the CIRP during the
recent period (e.g., Levich 2011). Furthermore, our sub-sample analysis shows that
there is a substantial di¤erence between 1 from di¤erent regimes. The size of this
parameter turns out to be much smaller for all maturities after the Lehman Shock,
indicating a further deterioration of the CIRP condition in the recent observations.
4 Time-varying forward premium bias
In order to illustrate time-dependent bias, we estimate the time-varying parameter,
1, as in Eq. 4 using Kalman lter with the random coe¢ cients model. The Kalman
ltering method is widely used in many research elds such as engineering, but today
it is also used in nance too. This method assumes a linear dynamic system to obtain
unobservable components (t and 1t).
fpjt = t + 1teit + et (4)
1t = 1t 1 + "t
t = t 1 + zt
where et  N(0; Vt) and "t; zt  N(0;Wt), and these residuals are internally
and mutually independent errors (see Appendix for explanations about the Kalman
ltering method).
The estimates of 1t which are of our interest, are shown for all maturities in Fig.
2. First it shows that 1t is higher for the long-maturity, and is indeed close to the
8The rst and last 15% of observations are trimmed in order to carry out these tests.
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theoretical value of unity for the 12 month-maturity asset. Second, the parameters
are very stable prior to 2008; interestingly, the e¤ect on the forward premium puzzle
of the bursting of the IT bubble seems rather limited from this gure. In contrast,
they decline substantially after the Lehman Shock. Furthermore, although there
is some recovery in the parameters after the Lehman Shock, the parameters drop
again in 2011 when the Greek debt crisis resumed to adversely a¤ect other European
countries such as Italy and Spain. A drop in these parameters is more signicant
for a longer maturity asset (Fig. 2).
We analyze if these time-varying parameters which measure the forward premium
puzzle can be explained by our proxy of the risk premium. Taking into account the
possible di¤erent order of integration of the data, the next equations (5a and 5b)
are estimated by the OLS with the Newey-West method. As can be seen in Fig.
1 and 2, the puzzle becomes more signicant at times of nancial turmoil (i.e.,
risk premiums), and thus we expect a negative relationship between them (i.e.,
1; 2; 3; 4<0) in Eq. 5a and 5b.
1t = 1 + 1Rpeuro,t + 2RpUSA;t + et (5a)
1t = 2 + 3Rpeuro,t + 4RpUSA;t + ut (5b)
Overall, an increase in the risk premium (Rp) is found to reduce the parameter
size (Table 4); in other words, a forward premium bias is more severe during periods
of high uncertainty. What is more, the US risk premium is found to be more signi-
cantly associated with this parameter. Indeed, regardless of the specication of 1t,
the risk premium for the Euro turns out to be always statistically insignicant. This
seems to be consistent with the ndings of previous studies (Byrne and Nagayasu
2012) that the US market is very inuential over other European economies. The
signicant inuence of the US economy and economic policies can be observed in
both advanced and developing countries (Bansal and Dahlquist 2000).
In order to understand the stationarity of the data, we carry out the most con-
ventional unit root test (i.e., the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test) for 1t and risk
premiums. The t statistics reported in Table 5 suggest that the level of time-varying
parameters (i.e., 1t) seems to be nonstationary, but that of the proxy for risk premi-
ums (Rp) is stationary since in the latter case their t statistics are high (in absolute
terms) enough to reject the null hypothesis of the unit root against the alternative
of stationarity. The stationarity of risk premiums is consistent with previous studies
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(Nagayasu 2011) utilizing other currency pairs. Furthermore, we proceed to conduct
the unit root test for changes in 1t, and nd evidence of stationarity. This con-
clusion remains unchanged when the composition of exogenous terms has altered.
Thus given the stationarity of 1t and risk premiums, the results in the upper half
of Table 4 seem statistically more appropriate. For this reason, we focus on the US
risk premium in the subsequent study.
5 The modied CIRP relationship
More formally, we shall analyze from a di¤erent perspective, if the forward premium
bias becomes more signicant during moments of turbulence. In this regard, two
modications are made to the standard CIRP.
First, given that the CIRP su¤ers from a nonlinearity problem reported in Table
3, we shall re-examine the standard CIRP relationship using the Markov-Switching
(MS) model which can be expressed as Eq. 6a and 6b. While time-varying para-
meters can be calculated using the random coe¢ cient model like before, the MS
model is attractive in order to obtain regime (rather than time)-specic estimates
and conclusions. The MS model can also prove useful since the unobservable regime
type can be identied endogenously by the data.
Regime 0 : fpjt = 
0 + 01eit + et et  N(0; 2) (6a)
Regime 1 : fpjt = 
1 + 11eit + et et  N(0; 2) (6b)
These are the two-regime MS models, and the superscripts on the parame-
ters (i.e., 0 and 1) refer to the regimes.9 The regime used will depend upon the
unobservable variable (st) which follows a Markov chain, and the probability of
shifting from one regime to another will be determined by the previous regime:
pijn = P [st+1 = ijst = n], 8i, n 2 f1; 2g. The total of transition probabilities has to
be equal to one;
P1
0 pijn = 1. Estimation of parameters and transition probabilities
of unobservable states is carried out here using the ltering method developed by
Kim (1994).10
9The number of regimes has been decided since they are supported by our unit root tests.
Furthermore, our decision was made since the two-regime model is the most basic nonlinear model
and there is no solid economic theory to suggest a greater number of regimes.
10The MS model is estimated by Ox.
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Table 6 shows estimates from the two-regime MS model, and for presentation
purposes, the smoothed transition probability is plotted in Fig 3. According to this
gure, Regime 1 corresponds to the tranquil time, and Regime 0 to the crisis period
because the probability in this regime increases at the time of the Lehman Shock
and the recent Greek crisis. Thus the crisis period (i.e., Regime 0) is rather short
compared with the length of the tranquil time.
Based on this regime classication, we observe evidence of a more severe forward
premium bias during these crisis periods (Table 6). Exceptions among crises are
the IT bubble and the September 11 attacks which seem to have had a very limited
e¤ect on the forward premium puzzle. Thus these early crises did not seem to have
universal e¤ects compared with the Lehman Shock and Greek debt crisis. Again,
this appears to be consistent with Figure 2 where 1t is relatively stable in our early
sample period and with the conventional view that the Lehman Shock and the Greek
debt crisis are more signicant in size and are more global in nature involving other
countries.
In order to justify use of a nonlinear approach, a statistical test is also conducted
to provide evidence of nonlinearity in the CIRP. The LM test expressed in terms of a
2 statistic (Davies 1987) raises strong evidence of nonlinearity in the system (Table
6). The null hypothesis that the sensitivity is the same across regimes (Regimes 0
and 1) is rejected at the 1% signicance level. This is consistent with our preliminary
analysis using the parameter stability tests in Table 3.
The second modication to the standard CIRP is made by incorporating the US
risk premium which was found to be closely associated with changes in 1t. The
results from this modied CIRP are reported in Table 7. Again a result similar to
Table 4 is obtained for the parameters measuring the forward premium puzzle. In
other words, the risk premium enters negatively in the equation to make up for the
US interest rate. As can be seen in Eq. 3, this negative parameter is necessary
to explain the forward premium puzzle (i.e., a negative bias) given the positive
correlation between interest rate di¤erentials and the risk premium (Table 2).
In addition, while we conrm the importance of the risk premium in almost
all cases, Rp is found to play a more signicant role in the short-term forward
premium, which is again conrmation that the longer-term yield tends to contain
more information about risk factors than the short-term rate. A signicant role
of the risk premium is in sharp contrast to the classic study (Froot and Frankel
1989) using the sample observations in the 1970s and 1980s. However, our nding
is consistent with more recent studies, e.g., Co¤ey et al (2009) and Levich (2011)
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who claimed the signicant role of counterparty risk in 2008.
Furthermore, improvements in the forward premium bias are more prominently
observed during a crisis period when the risk premium increases. There are 5 in-
stances out of 6 maturity cases where there is an (a marginal) improvement in
parameters in Regime 0. In contrast, the size of the parameters drops, although
very marginally, on 2 occasions during the tranquil periods. Thus, considering the
magnitude of changes in these parameters for both Regimes 0 and 1, the net e¤ect
of Rp generally seems to be working toward improvements in this forward premium
bias. However, given only modest improvements in the parameters and strong ev-
idence of nonlinearity still remained in the modied CIRP (Table 7), we conclude
that the risk premium does not seem to provide the whole story about the time-
varying puzzle.
6 Conclusion
This paper re-evaluates the forward premium puzzle, using data including the recent
crisis periods, for the pair of Euroland and the USA which have close links with the
Lehman Shock and the Greek debt crisis. Unlike previous studies, we introduce a
proxy of the risk premium, and the sensitivity of the puzzle to the risk premium is
analyzed by estimating time-dependent measures of the puzzle.
Then, we provide evidence that the forward premium puzzle has become more
signicant during the Lehman Shock period, with further deviations from the CIRP.
The parameter for interest rate di¤erentials is well below the theoretical value of
unity although it is still positive. Our further analysis suggests that the introduction
of the risk premium seems to lessen the puzzle particularly during chaotic moments.
Since there was no major nancial regulation imposed during this period in these
countries, our nding of a more severe forward premium puzzle during the very
recent period implies some caution about using the standard CIRP as a measure of
international capital market integration.
Finally, we would like to point out some directions for possible future research.
First, whilst we acknowledge the importance of other factors other than the risk
premium, it is very useful to nd some other proxy for the risk premium which
has more explanatory power over the forward premium. As reported, our modied
CIRP model is still in the form of nonlinearity. This suggests that our proxy may
not be adequate for explaining the forward premium puzzle, and the measurement
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error may be potentially signicant. Second, while this study discussed a forward
premium puzzle in the context of the CIRP (i.e., the forward premium and interest
rate di¤erentials), further analysis can be usefully carried out using the Fama-type
model and the covered interest rate parity condition. In this way, one might usefully
clarify the role of investorsexpectations which may di¤er from time to time.
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Appendix
Data Sources
 Forward exchange rates: Data for the maturity length of one, two, three, six,
nine and twelve months are downloaded from DataStream.
 Spot exchange rates: Bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the USD are sourced
from DataStream.
 Interest rates: LIBOR interest rates for the maturity length of one, two, three,
six, nine and twelve months are downloaded from DataStream.
 Financial market volatility index: the volatility index (Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility type index) for Euroland and the USA, which measures ex-
pectations of volatility in major stock price index (S&P500 and EURO STOXX
50) are downloaded from DataStream.
Kalman Filter
The Kalman ltering method is widely used in many research elds.
Let us write Eq. 4 using bt = (; t)
0 as
Yt = Xtbt + vt
bt = bt 1 + wt
where vt  N(0; Vt) and wt  N(0;Wt), and the initial condition is assumed to
be b0jD0  N(m0; C0), where D0 is the information set available at time 0. Then
the posterior for bt 1 is bt 1jDt 1  N(mt 1; Ct 1), and the prior for bt isbtjDt 1 
N(mt 1; Rt), where Rt = Ct 1+Wt. The one-step ahead forecast for Y is YtjDt 1 
N(ft; Qt) where ft = Xtmt 1 and Qt = X2tRt + vt. In short,
bt
Yt
jDt 1

 N

mt 1
ft

;

Rt RtXt
XtRt Qt

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Table 1. Basic statistics for the covered interest parity condition
Obs Mean SE Min Max
fp1M 160 -0.024 0.120 -0.245 0.164
fp2M 160 -0.046 0.234 -0.471 0.326
fp3M 160 -0.070 0.348 -0.718 0.487
fp6M 160 -0.140 0.681 -1.390 0.949
fp9M 160 -0.220 0.994 -2.072 1.405
fp12M 160 -0.315 1.286 -2.782 1.794ei1M 160 -0.160 1.449 -2.968 2.152ei2M 160 -0.153 1.449 -2.794 2.113ei3M 160 -0.136 1.462 -2.949 2.188ei6M 160 -0.157 1.440 -2.844 2.121ei9M 160 -0.180 1.422 -2.792 2.226ei12M 160 -0.213 1.402 -2.849 2.266
Note: fp is the forward premium, ei is the interest rate di¤erential, and SE is the
standard error.
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Table 3. Covered interest parity relationships
M1 M2 M3 M6 M9 M12
Full Sample
Const -0.011 -0.022 -0.038 -0.068 -0.097 -0.124
[0.002] [0.004] [0.006] [0.011] [0.017] [0.024]ei 0.081 0.158 0.233 0.464 0.685 0.897
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] [0.010] [0.014]
Instability test
Andrews-Quandt 44.409 53.869 60.277 50.313 40.589 35.306
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Andrews-Ploberger 19.509 24.550 27.405 22.778 18.423 16.402
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Break date 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9
1998M11-2008M8
Const 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.015
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.011]ei 0.086 0.167 0.248 0.495 0.730 0.956
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.007]
2008M9-2012M4
Const -0.018 -0.039 -0.077 -0.129 -0.139 -0.115
[0.005] [0.011] [0.018] [0.039] [0.048] [0.055]ei 0.058 0.118 0.186 0.354 0.480 0.560
[0.011] [0.023] [0.035] [0.067] [0.087] [0.105]
Note: p-values for the instability test are based on Hansen (1997). The standard
error is shown in brackets. Parameters which are signicant at the 5% level or higher
are in italics.
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Table 4. The relationship between parameters (1) and nancial uncertainty
1 M1 M2 M3 M6 M9 M12
Constant 0.009 0.324 0.501 0.943 1.407 1.894
[0.004] [0.012] [0.020] [0.037] [0.049] [0.063]
RpEuro -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.022 -0.023 0.002
[0.002] [0.017] [0.026] [0.044] [0.061] [0.080]
RpUSA -0.002 -0.039 -0.058 -0.090 -0.149 -0.244
[0.002] [0.016] [0.025] [0.044] [0.061] [0.079]
TREND 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
1
Constant 0.166 0.324 0.501 0.943 1.407 1.894
[0.006] [0.012] [0.020] [0.037] [0.049] [0.063]
RpEuro -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.022 -0.023 0.002
[0.008] [0.017] [0.026] [0.044] [0.061] [0.080]
RpUSA -0.020 -0.039 -0.058 -0.090 -0.149 -0.244
[0.008] [0.016] [0.025] [0.044] [0.061] [0.079]
TREND 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Estimation based on Eq. 5. The gures in brackets are standard errors.
Parameters which are signicant at the 5% level or higher are in italics.
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Table 5. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
Variables Const Const+Trend
1
M1 0.060 -1.314
1
M2 -0.281 -1.687
1
M3 -0.161 -1.649
1
M6 -0.273 -1.864
1
M9 0.694 -1.035
1
M12 -0.227 -1.890
RpEuro -3.399 -3.392
RpUSA -3.201 -3.191
1
M1 -1821.630 -1791.820
1
M2 -8.457 -8.550
1
M3 -7.880 -8.001
1
M6 -12.617 -6.465
1
M9 -12.617 -12.795
1
M12 -12.613 -5.812
Note: The null hypothesis of nonstationary is tested against the alternative of
nonstationarity. The lag length is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion
with the maximum of 12. The critical values for the constant (Const) are -3.472
[1%], -2.880[5%] and -2.576[10%]. Those with the constant and trend are -4.020
[1%], -3.440 [5%] and -3.140 [10%].
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Figure 1. Proxies for risk premiums
Euro USA
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
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Figure 2. Time-varying 1
M1
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Note: M1 to M12 represent parameters (1) for a
maturity of 1 to 12 months.
22
Figure 3. Smoothed transition probabilities from the MS model
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